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Abstract
A feasible, secure and collusion-attack-free quantum sealed-bid auction protocol is proposed using a modified scheme for
multi-party circular quantum key agreement. In the proposed protocol, the set of all (n) bidders is grouped in to l subsets
(sub-circles) in such a way that only the initiator (who prepares the quantum state to be distributed for a particular round of
communication and acts as the receiver in that round) is a member of all the subsets (sub-circles) prepared for a particular round,
while any other bidder is part of only a single subset. All n bidders and auctioneer initiate one round of communication, and each
of them prepares l copies of a (r − 1)-partite entangled state (one for each sub-circle), where r = n
l
+ 1. The efficiency and
security of the proposed protocol are critically analyzed. It is shown that the proposed protocol is free from the collusion attacks
that are possible on the existing schemes of quantum sealed-bid auction. Further, it is observed that the security against collusion
attack increases with the increase in l, but that reduces the complexity (number of entangled qubits in each entangled state) of the
entangled states to be used and that makes the scheme scalable and implementable with the available technologies. The additional
security and scalability is shown to arise due to the use of a circular structure in place of a complete-graph or tree-type structure
used earlier.
1 Introduction
In our daily life, we often find it difficult to perform all the tasks ourselves. Consequently, we outsource some tasks. For
outsourcing a task at the lowest possible price (or to sell a product at the highest possible price), we often use a process referred
to as auction, which is extremely relevant for imperfect market. Specifically, in an imperfect market, it may be hard to find (a)
an actual valuation of an item which you wish to sell or buy, and (b) to identify potential buyers or sellers. Auction helps us in
obtaining these information. This process (auction) is very important in today’s society and is frequently used in various forms.
Interestingly, the notion of an auction is almost as old as the civilization [5]. In fact, this process links market and economics
to cryptography and thus to mathematics and computer science. Interestingly, the recent developments in the field of quantum
cryptography [2, 3, 6] further extend this link and establish a link between physics (especially, quantum mechanics) and market
(see [13, 15, 17, 18] and references therein). With time various types of auction mechanism and the associated rules have been
evolved. Based on those rules, auction schemes may be classified into a few classes which includes (but not restricted to), (i)
English auction [30], (ii) Dutch auction [20], and (iii) Sealed-bid second-price (Vickrey) auction [12]. Here it would be apt to note
that in the English auction, one of the bidders announces his bid publicly at the beginning of the auction process. The competitor
bidders announce higher price bids and the bid price rises until we find there is no further bid. The bidder, who announced the
highest bid, wins the bid and pays his bid. In contrast, in a Dutch auction, the auctioneer announces a high bid and then gradually
lowers the bid. The bidder who first accepts the bid, wins and he has to pay that price. These bidding mechanisms are traditionally
performed publicly, where all bidders can listen the call of the other bidders. However, for various reasons, it may not be always
possible (and desirable too) to arrange a physical presence of all the bidders at the same place. Further, it may not be desired
that the bid of a party gets influenced by the bid of another as it happens in publicly organized English and Dutch actions, where
the bids are public information. This led to the idea of another class of auction mechanism which is referred to as sealed-bid
second-price auction. In this frequently used scheme for auction, bids are private information instead of public announcement.
Further, the bids are made simultaneously instead of one after another, and computation of all the bids is done together, and
the bidder who announces the highest bid, wins the bid, and the winner bidder pays the price of the second-highest bid. These
features distinguish it from English and Dutch auction schemes. As this type of auction demands security of the bids (to keep
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them private) it reduces to an important cryptographic problem. Several solutions using classical cryptographic methods have
been proposed for this problem [7, 8, 12, 26, 29], but the fact that classical cryptography cannot provide an unconditional security
whereas quantum cryptography can (cf. [16]), led to a set of resent proposals for quantum sealed-bid auction- where quantum
resources are used to perform sealed-bid auction in an unconditionally secure manner. The first quantum sealed-bid auction
scheme was proposed by Naseri in 2008 [13]. In 2009, various attack and defense strategies were proposed in connection with the
Naseri protocol [10,19,31,35]. In 2010, Zhao et al., proposed a new sealed-bid auction scheme with post-confirmation [34]. In the
same year, Zhang proposed another scheme for quantum sealed-bid auction using EPR pairs [32]. Subsequently, in 2014, Zhao
improved this post-confirmation-based protocol [33]. The continual interest on this interesting and upcoming field led to a few
more interesting schemes. For example, in 2015, Wang et al., proposed a novel quantum sealed-bid auction protocol that utilizes a
secret ordering in the post-confirmation [27], and very recently in 2016, Liu et al., have proposed a scheme for multiparty quantum
sealed-bid auction using single photons as message carrier [9]. However, all these schemes of quantum sealed-bid auctions have
some limitations, and most of them are vulnerable under specific eavesdropping strategy. This fact and the importance of the
sealed-bid auction schemes in the modern economy motivated us to design a new protocol for sealed-bid auction that is free from
the limitations of the previously proposed schemes.
Remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the limitations of the existing schemes and thus
establish the motivation for designing a new protocol for quantum sealed-bid auction that would be free from the limitations of
the existing protocols for the same task. In Section 3, we present a new protocol for quantum sealed-bid auction, and illustrate
the working of the same with an explicit example. In Section 4, we critically analyze the security and efficiency of the proposed
scheme. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section 5.
2 Limitations of the existing schemes for quantum sealed-bid auction
The limitations of all the existing protocols of quantum sealed-bid auction may be summarized on the basis of structure of the
arrangement of bidders and the auctioneer in the scheme. Naseri’s original protocol [13] was based on a tree-type structure. In a
tree-type structure (see Fig. 1 a), the auctioneer is like a root while the bidders work as nodes. Every node (bidder) is required
to send his/her information to the root (auctioneer) directly, and none of the nodes would send his/her information (bid) to the
remaining nodes (bidders). In this type of auction schemes, if the auctioneer colludes with one of the bidders, he can cheat the
auction process by modifying the colluder’s bid, and therefore, announcing him the winner. In fact, all the remaining bidders have
no choice but to trust the auctioneer.
To circumvent this problem Zhao et al., [34] introduced a post-confirmation-based technique. All post-confirmation-technique-
based quantum sealed-bid auction schemes convert the tree-type structure present in the initial schemes of sealed-bid auction to a
complete-graph structure (see Fig. 1 b). In the schemes that use a complete-graph-type structure, each node is directly connected
to all the remaining nodes. Suppose there are n bidders (node) and an auctioneer then in the post-confirmation-technique-based
quantum sealed-bid auction scheme a complete-graph of n + 1 node is obtained. This complete-graph structure has its own
limitations related to scalability, implementation, cost, more traffic, more memory requirement, etc. One can easily observe that
these problems are present in all the post-confirmation-technique-based quantum sealed-bid auction schemes [9, 27, 32–34].
Further, in all the post-confirmation-technique-based quantum sealed-bid auction protocols, all the bidders send their bids
to each other in an encoded form, which is used for post-confirmation after the winner of the auction is announced. They may
choose to send the bid values to each other either before they send it to the auctioneer or after that. However, both of these kinds
of schemes can be attacked. Specifically, in the former case, the auctioneer may collude with one of the bidders to modify the
bid initially proposed by the colluding bidder, and thus help him (the colluding bidder) to win the auction. While in the latter
possibility, a single bidder (some of the colluding bidders) may extract the bid value of another bidder (all other bidders) using an
optimized measurement on the accessible (n− 1) copies of the bids sent to all the competing bidders. As there exist some serious
attack strategies against complete-graph-type schemes as well as tree-type schemes, we require a scheme of sealed-bid auction
where all the parties (both auctioneer and bidders) get access to the information at the same time.
Here, we provide a solution of this problem by proposing a protocol using circular structure (see Fig. 1 c) instead of tree or
complete-graph structures. As there also exist a few collusion attacks on the circular quantum communication schemes (specif-
ically, on multiparty circular quantum key agreement schemes), we have incorporated the solution provided in Refs. [24, 25]
against those attacks on the circular schemes for sending bids to auctioneer and competing bidders. We will discuss the possible
attack strategies and the relevance of the solution adopted in the security section. In what follows, we first propose a protocol for
sealed-bid auction that would be free from the limitations of the previous schemes mentioned in this section.
3 Proposed protocol: CMQKA-based scheme for sealed-bid auction
In this section, we propose a scheme using which the sealed-bid auction task can be accomplished without confronting the attacks
possible in the schemes proposed in the recent past. Suppose there are n biddersB1, B2, B3, . . . Bn and an auctioneer. Therefore,
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Figure 1: (Color online) Various possible arrangements of bidders and auctioneer in a (a) tree-type (b) complete-graph-type (c)
circular-type of sealed-bid auction schemes.
our task may be summed up as each bidder Bi wish to send his bid bi to the auctioneer in a secure manner. Further, he also needs
to share this information with the remaining bidders as well. At the same time, he must make sure that any single party (or a set
of parties) does not get access to this information until he wishes them to, i.e., no one should be able to take advantage from this
information.
In our scheme, to initiate the auction all the parties (the auctioneer and all the bidders) agree on a uniform arrangement in a
circular manner. Additionally, they also decide to use disjoint subgroups (of a group of unitary operators which provide orthogonal
states on the application) to encode their bid values as discussed in the past for MQKA scheme [22]. The disjoint groups are those
groups which have only identity element in common, i.e., A and B are disjoint groups if A ∩B = {I} . Requirement of disjoint
subgroups is justified as the receiver will loose the bijective mapping between each encoding operation and the initial and final
state if two senders would apply the same operation.
Specifically, they obtain n disjoint subgroups of order two, where one element is identity, to encode each bit of their secret
bids. The bidder Bi is assigned a disjoint subgroup {UI , Ui}, where UI is the identity operator, and the set of all these unitary
operators {UI , U1, . . . Ui, . . . Un} should be a part of a larger group of at least order n. It should be noted that an operational
definition of the group (or a modified group as mentioned in [1, 22, 23]) is used hereafter neglecting the global phase.
Before we proceed with the protocol, we would also like to mention that we have already modified the MQKA scheme [22]
to circumvent the participant attack mentioned beforehand and in the security section. Due to this modification, the structural
arrangement of participants in our scheme (which is a circular structure) may be viewed as an intermediate structure between the
tree-type and complete-graph structures. In what follows, we will establish that tree-type structure based scheme and complete-
graph structure based scheme for quantum sealed-bid auction can be obtained as special cases of the circular structure based
scheme proposed here. The quantum sealed-bid auction scheme works as follows, where we assume the bidders and the auctioneer
arranged in a circular manner (cf. Fig. 1 (c)).
Step1: The auctioneer divides all the bidders (arranged in a large circle) in l number of sub-circles in such a way that each
sub-circle contains equal number of bidders, i.e., r = nl + 1. It should be noted here that only the auctioneer is part of all
the sub-circles. Thus each sub-circle contains (r − 1) distinct bidders, who are part of only a single sub-circle.
Similarly, each bidder also prepares l sub-circles of the remaining bidders and the auctioneer from the larger circle. The
division of circle in sub-circles by each bidder is similar, but not the same to each other or auctioneer. In fact, it is important
in this arrangement that the bidder (initiator) himself should remain part of all the sub-circles he prepares.
Step2: To start the auction, the auctioneer prepares l number of (r − 1)-qubit entangled states |ψ〉1, |ψ〉2, . . . |ψ〉l, one for each
sub-circle formed in Step1. He may/may not prepare different entangled states for each sub-circle. Subsequently, he divides
each (r − 1)-qubit entangled state into two sequences. The first sequence containing p number of qubits is called “travel
qubit sequence (ti)”, and the other one with (r − p− 1) qubits is known as “home qubit sequence (hi)”.
Step3: All the bidders also prepare the same number of (r − 1)-qubit entangled states and divide them into two sequences,
namely, home and travel qubit sequences, similar to what the auctioneer has performed in Step2.
Step4: Auctioneer can begin with the bidding process by sending his l different travel sequences (tis) to the first bidders in each
sub-circle. Prior sending these qubits, he has to insert an equal number of decoy qubits randomly in each ti to ensure
security against an adversary [14, 21].
At the same time all bidders Bis also send their l number of tis (only after inserting an equal number of decoy qubits) to
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the first members of their respective l sub-circles. At the end of this step, all the legitimate parties have received travel
qubits from one of their adjacent party (either auctioneer or a bidder). Subsequently, they perform a security check using
the decoy qubits inserted in tis among the sender and the receiver of each ti. If they find traces of an eavesdropping attempt
inferred from the errors more than a threshold value, then they abort the protocol, otherwise proceed to the next step.
Step5: Once it is ensured that all the parties have received the tis in a secure manner, they can encode their messages on it.
Specifically, each bidder Bi encodes his respective bid bi, and the auctioneer may choose to encode some random bits or
information regarding the auction on the traveling qubits, which they have received in Step4. For encoding each bit of the
secret they use the prior decided unitary operations Uis to obtain the encoded sequence t′i.
Subsequently, all the parties prepare the same number of decoy qubits as in the travel sequence and insert them randomly in
t′i to obtain an enlarged sequence. In fact, at the end of this step, each bidder and the auctioneer has encoded his information
only on the quantum state prepared by his adjacent party (bidder/auctioneer).
Step6: The auctioneer and all the bidders send the enlarged sequences to their next party in their respective sub-circles, i.e.,
Bi → Bi+1. On the receipt of this sequence each receiving party performs a security check using the decoy qubits with
the sending party following the same strategy as in Step4. In case of fewer than threshold errors, each party encodes the
bid/information on the received travel sequence t′i using the assigned unitary operations to obtain t
′′
i . Finally, he sends this
encoded sequence to the next party only after inserting adequate decoy qubits in it.
The same process is repeated for the next (r − 3) steps until all the (r − 1) parties in each sub-circle have encoded their
information. In the end, the last party in each sub-circle sends this encoded sequence to the first party who had prepared
the quantum state in a secure manner.
Step7: The auctioneer and all the bidders now possess all the qubits of l entangled states they have prepared. Therefore, they
can perform a measurement on the entangled particles from the travel and home qubit sequences in the basis set it was
initially prepared. Due to the presence of a bijective mapping between the set of encoding operations of all the bidders and
auctioneer and the initial-final entangled state pair, one can easily deduce all the bid values bis. The auctioneer declares the
bidder with the highest bid as the winner of the auction, which can be easily verified by each bidder.
In what follows, we will show an explicit example of the proposed scheme for six bidders and an auctioneer. Before that it is
customary to mention that the proposed scheme has one unexplored advantage that it can also be performed without an auctioneer.
Apart from this, breaking a larger circle into smaller sub-circles not only provides security against participants’ collusion attack,
but also reduces the requirement of the number of entangled qubits required. As the preparation and maintenance of a higher
dimensional entangled state are difficult, it becomes significant from the point of view of an experimental realization of the
proposed scheme.
Further, as mentioned beforehand that the proposed scheme can be modified to obtain both tree-type and complete-graph-type
auction schemes (cf. Fig. 1) as its limiting cases. Specifically, in our scheme, if l = n, i.e., all the bidders are sending their bid
information to the auctioneer and all the remaining bidders, it reduces to a complete-graph-type of auction scheme. Additionally,
if only the auctioneer prepares the state and receives the bid values from all the bidders (i.e., the bidders do not send bid values
among themselves), then a tree-type auction scheme can be deduced.
3.1 An example
Here, we show an explicit example in which we suppose there are six bidders B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6 and one auctioneer A.
The bidders (Bis) want to encode their bid values bis, respectively. To initiate the auction all the parties agree on a uniform
arrangement in a circular manner. They further decide their unitary operations Uis to be used for encoding their bids. In this case,
without loss of generality, we may assume that the bidders B2, B4, and B6 use the unitary operation {I, iY } for encoding their
bids, while B1, B3, and B5 use {I ,X}. The auctioneer encodes using the unitary operations {I, Z}. It is also predecided that all
the parties will perform I to encode 0, and the other unitary to encode 1.
The working of our example scheme is summarized in the following steps.
Example-Step1: In this example, we wish to ensure that fewer than four participants cannot successfully collude to cheat. For
the same the auctioneer (and all bidders) divide all the participants in l = 3 number of sub-circles in such a way that each
sub-circle contains an equal number of bidders, i.e., r = nl + 1 =
6
3 + 1 = 3. One such arrangement is shown in Fig.
2. Note that only A is present in all the sub-circles, otherwise all the bidder are a part of only single sub-circle. Namely,
the Sub-circle sA1 contains A, B1, B2; Sub-circle s
A
2 contains A, B3, B4; and Sub-circle s
A
3 contains A, B5, B6. Using a
similar approach all the bidders make their three sub-circles which are mentioned in detail in Table 1.
Example-Step2: The auctioneer prepares three distinct 2-qubit entangled states (Bell states) to receive each bit value of the secret
bids from each bidder. For example, he may prepare three copies of |ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉). He may also to use different
entangled state for each sub-circle, like |ψ+〉 for sA1 , |ψ−〉 for sA2 , and |φ+〉 for sA3 . In general, he prepares 3N Bells states
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Parties
in
auction
Unitary
operation
(U)
1st sub-circle 2nd sub-circle 3rd sub-circle
A {I, Z} sA1 = A,B1, B2 sA2 = A,B3, B4 sA3 = A,B5, B6
B1 {I ,X} sB11 = B1, B2, B3 sB12 = B1, B4, B5 sB13 = B1, B6, A
B2 {I, iY } sB21 = B2, B3, B4 sB22 = B2, B5, B6 sB23 = B2, A,B1
B3 {I ,X} sB31 = B3, B4, B5 sB32 = B3, B6, A sB33 = B3, B1, B2
B4 {I, iY } sB41 = B4, B5, B6 sB42 = B4, A,B1 sB43 = B4, B2, B3
B5 {I ,X} sB51 = B5, B6, A sB52 = B5, B1, B2 sB53 = B5, B3, B4
B6 {I, iY } sB61 = B6, A,B1 sB62 = B6, B2, B3 sB63 = B6, B4, B5
Table 1: The unitary operations assigned to each party along with the arrangement of sub-circles are mentioned explicitly across
the auctioneer A and each bidder Bi in an example scheme with one auctioneer and six bidders in a circular sealed-bid auction
scheme.
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Figure 2: (Color online) A circular-type of sealed-bid auction scheme. The auctioneer (A) and all the bidders (Bi) are arranged
in a circle shown in smooth (blue) line. The Sub-circle sA1 is presented by gray (dotted) arrows; Sub-circle s
A
2 by green (solid
dense) arrows; and Sub-circle sA3 by yellow (solid semi-transparent) arrows.
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Parties
in
auction
Initial ith set of Bell states Operations in Round 1 Operations in Round 2
A |ψsA1 〉|ψsA2 〉|ψsA3 〉 (UB1 ⊗ UB3 ⊗ UB5) (UB2 ⊗ UB4 ⊗ UB6)
B1 |ψsB11 〉|ψsB12 〉|ψsB13 〉 (UB2 ⊗ UB4 ⊗ UB6) (UB3 ⊗ UB5 ⊗ UA)
B2 |ψsB21 〉|ψsB22 〉|ψsB23 〉 (UB3 ⊗ UB5 ⊗ UA) (UB4 ⊗ UB6 ⊗ UB1)
B3 |ψsB31 〉|ψsB32 〉|ψsB33 〉 (UB4 ⊗ UB6 ⊗ UB1) (UB5 ⊗ UA ⊗ UB2)
B4 |ψsB41 〉|ψsB42 〉|ψsB43 〉 (UB5 ⊗ UA ⊗ UB2) (UB6 ⊗ UB1 ⊗ UB3)
B5 |ψsB51 〉|ψsB52 〉|ψsB53 〉 (UB6 ⊗ UB1 ⊗ UB3) (UA ⊗ UB2 ⊗ UB4)
B6 |ψsB61 〉|ψsB62 〉|ψsB63 〉 (UA ⊗ UB2 ⊗ UB4) (UB1 ⊗ UB3 ⊗ UB5)
Table 2: The scheme is summarized here with the ith triplet of Bell states (one for each sub-circle) prepared by each party
to obtain ith bit value of the secret from all the remaining parties as mentioned in the second column against each party. The
operations performed on the initial state in the first and second rounds are also explicitly mentioned in the same rows in the last
two columns. Here, Ui = I⊗Ue, where Ue is the unitary corresponding to the bit value a user wants to encode and are mentioned
in Column 2 of Table 1.
independently to receive bids of N -bits from all the bidders. Then he divides all three sets of N Bell states (prepared for
each sub-circle) to obtain two sequences of all the first qubits hi (home qubit sequence) and the second qubits ti (travel
qubit sequence).
Example-Step3: All the bidders also prepare the same number of Bell states and obtain two sequences of home and travel qubits
as the auctioneer in previous step.
Column 2 of Table 2 lists three Bell states each party prepares to obtain information regarding ith bit of the secret, like(
|ψsJ1 〉 ⊗ |ψsJ2 〉 ⊗ |ψsJ3 〉
)
is the ith set of Bell states prepared by J th party.
Example-Step4: The auctioneer sends all three travel qubit sequences tis to the first bidders (i.e., B1, B3, B5) of all three sub-
circles sA1 , s
A
2 , s
A
3 , respectively. He also inserts an equal number of decoy qubits randomly in all the traveling sequences.
At the same time all the biddersBi also send their tis (after inserting decoy qubits) to the next bidderBi+1 in their respective
sub-circles sBij . All the recipients now perform the security check with corresponding senders using decoy qubits; and if
they find an eavesdropper they abort the protocol, otherwise continue the process.
Example-Step5: Each bidder encodes his respective bid bi, and the auctioneer encodes random bits on ti, which they had received
in the previous step, using a unitary operation U mentioned in Column 2 of Table 1. In fact, Column 3 of Table 2 lists the
operations performed in this round. Though we have not mentioned the transformed state in the table, it is a trivial task to
obtain that the auctioneer’s (and similarly other’s) transformed state becomes
(
UB1 |ψsA1 〉 ⊗ UB3 |ψsA2 〉 ⊗ UB5 |ψsA3 〉
)
.
Example-Step6: Subsequently, all the parties send the encoded qubits to the next party in a secure manner, who also performs
the unitary operations corresponding to his bit value before sending the travel qubits finally to the party who has prepared it.
The unitary operations performed on the quantum state are mentioned in Column 4 of Table 2. The auctioneer’s quantum
state may be written as
(
UB2UB1 |ψsA1 〉 ⊗ UB4UB3 |ψsA2 〉 ⊗ UB6UB5 |ψsA3 〉
)
.
It is interesting to see here that the combined state contains the encoding from all the bidders. Similarly, all the parties hold
the message encoded travel qubits and home qubits they have prepared.
Example-Step7: Finally, the auctioneer and all the bidder perform the Bell state measurement on all the three states and extract
the information regarding each Uis. Using which a winner may be chosen.
In Table 2, it is important to note that the operation in Round 2 (Column 4) can be obtained from the operation in Round 1
(Column 3), just by performing a cyclic permutation of rows. This can be attributed to the cyclic property of the scheme proposed
here.
4 Security and efficiency analysis
A sealed-bid auction process may be viewed as a multiparty computational task, where each party sends inputs to the auctioneer,
who computes the value of the function (i.e., maximum/minimum of all the inputs/bids). The security of a multiparty scheme
should be ensured both against an outsider and insider attacker. In fact, an insider attacker is more powerful than an outsider
attacker. Here, we will show the security of our sealed-bid auction scheme against both types of attacks.
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4.1 Outsider’s attacks
As the outsider’s attacks can be checked by using the standard eavesdropping checking techniques (subroutines) discussed in
Ref. [21]. Here, we restrict ourselves from elaborating on them. We just note that it is straight forward to observe that the use of
BB84 subroutine or GV subroutine can protect our scheme at least from the following types of outsider’s attacks: (i) Intercept-
resend attack, (ii) Entanglement measure attack, (iii) Disturbance or modification attack, (iv) Impersonation or man-in-the-middle
attack, and (v) Trojan-horse attack.
Specifically, the first three attacks may be foiled by the use of decoy qubits inserted by each sender. An eavesdropping attack
using one of these three techniques will always leave detectable traces at the receiver’s end (for details see [1]). Further, the
disturbance attack is only a type of denial of service attack so Eve do not get any advantage through it, but she may use it to
interrupt the auction.
To check the impersonation attack, a suitable authentication protocol is used and all the parties may inform regarding sending
and receiving of the qubits via an authenticated classical channel. It is also known that there exist suitable technical measures to
circumvent trojan-horse attack. Keeping this in mind, we now proceed to discuss insider’s attacks in detail.
4.2 Insider’s attacks
1. Participant attack: A single bidder may also try to attack the auction scheme. For example, a bidder Bi may choose
to send different bid values to the auctioneer and each voter. As a specific case, consider that the bid value sent to the
auctioneer is higher than that sent to the remaining bidders, and the auctioneer chooses him as the winner of the auction
and announces his bid value. However, the tally of the remaining bidders will show different value of the bid by that bidder.
This may be ascribed as a case of cheating and the auction will be called off. However, if Bi wishes to disrupt the auction
process, he may do so by using this strategy. In summary, a participant will not gain any benefit from this attack as he will
always be detected. Therefore, this attack can be viewed as a denial of service attack.
2. Collusion attack: Another interesting insider’s attack on a multiparty scheme is a collusion attack. Our scheme being a
circular-type scheme of multiparty quantum communication, increases the number of parties need to collude to obtain any
useful information. To elaborate this point, we may consider that the bidders Bi and Bi+m collude to learn the encoding
of all the m bidders lying between them in the circle. Best strategy for them would be that Bi would generate an entangled
state having an adequate number of qubits, and would send the same number of qubits that Bi has received from Bi−1 to
Bi+1. He would send the remaining qubits of the entangled states directly to Bi+m. At a later time, Bi+m will receive
the set of travel qubits form Bi+m−1, which would have encoded bidding information of all the (m− 1) bidders’ lying
between them. As Bi has already sent the home qubits of the entangled state he had prepared to Bi+m, he may now use
both set of qubits and the knowledge of initial state prepared by Bi to obtain information of all the (m− 1) bidders.
However, this attack will not be as effective as they wish it to be. Specifically, an effective attack that can deterministically
affect the outcome of the bidding process would require that Bi and Bi+n2 collude, as in that case, the colluding parties
would obtain the bid values of all the other bidders. Precisely, both Bi and Bi+n2 prepare entangled states and send their
travel qubits to Bi+1 and Bi+n2+1 and home qubits to Bi+n2 and Bi, respectively. After n/2 rounds, when both Bi and
Bi+n2 receive the encoding of all the remaining party they can choose their appropriate bid values. Further, it is important
to note that at least one of the colluding parties will always have access to the travel qubits after they have learnt other’s
secret. Therefore, they will leave no traces in this kind of an attack.
Here, the security against this attack is achieved here by breaking the circle into l sub-circles. In this case, if less than l
attackers collude, then they can not cheat the remaining bidders and the auctioneer. Thus, increase in the number l would
decrease the effectivity of this attack.
There is a quantitative measure to analyze the efficiency of a quantum communication scheme known as the qubit efficiency,
proposed in Ref. [4], given by η = cq+b . Here, c corresponds to the number of classical bits transmitted with the help of q number
of qubits and b-bits of classical communication. We will show the efficiency of the example protocol to give an idea about the
performance of the proposed scheme. However, qubit efficiency of the proposed scheme can also be calculated using the same
approach.
In the example of the proposed scheme qubit efficiency for sending each bit of bids from all the bidders can be calculated as
follows. In Sub-circle sA1 , cA = 2 bits of the message regarding bids of B1 and B2 were encoded using a Bell state (q
′
A = 2).
Additionally, one decoy qubit was inserted by each party in the sub-circle (i.e., A, B1, and B2) resulting in total dA = 3.
Therefore, total number of qubits used are qA = q′A + dA = 2 + 3 = 5. Further, no classical communication is involved so
bA = 0. The same scenario is repeated in Sub-circles sA2 and s
A
3 . Hence, for all the sub-circles initiated byA, the total contribution
in c and q are thrice of that calculated for one sub-circle, i.e., 6 and 15, respectively.
In one of the sub-circles initiated by the bidders Bi, the auctioneer A do not encode a useful message so it is not counted
as classical bit. Therefore, in six sub-circles
(
sB13 , s
B2
3 , s
B3
2 , s
B4
2 , s
B5
1 , s
B6
1
)
, where A is present contribution in c becomes
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1 bit, while the number of qubits used remain the same. The remaining 12 sub-circles initiated by the bidders will have the
same contribution in the calculations of c and q as that of the sub-circle initiated by A. Therefore, the total amount of classical
information transmitted is c = 2 × (3 + 12) + 1 × 6 = 36 bits and the same is done using q = 5 × 21 = 105 qubits, and
involving no classical communication b = 0 (except for eavesdropping checking). Finally, the auctioneer announces the winner
out of six competing bidders, which corresponds to b = log2 6 = 2.585 bits of additional classical communication. Hence, the
qubit efficiency of the proposed scheme (with each bid of n bits) turns out to be η = 36n105n+log2 6 ≈ 34.28% (if n  2.585). In
what follows, we compare the qubit efficiency of various schemes, and to do so, we have considered n 2.585 to be consistent.
The qubit efficiency of a tree-type sealed-bid auction (without post-confirmation) scheme [31] that would do a task similar
to what is done in the proposed scheme (however, at the end of the bidding process none of the bidders would obtain the bid
of others as it happens in our scheme) is calculated as 6n20n+log2 6 ≈ 30%, which appears to be lower than the qubit efficiency
of the proposed scheme. On the contrary, a tree-type scheme would appear more efficient in comparison with the proposed
scheme, if we consider that the task (auction process) is restricted to a situation where bidding information is only communicated
to the auctioneer. To be specific, we may consider that the information communicated by each bidder to all other bidders is
not meaningful information (as far as the task is concerned), and it does not contribute to c, which corresponds to meaningful
classical information. In that case, the efficiency of the proposed scheme would be 6n105n+log2 6 ≈ 5.71%. In the above discussed
situation, qubit efficiency of a sealed-bid auction scheme based on complete-graph structure and proposed to be realized using
single photons [9] is obtained as 6n83n+log2 6 ≈ 7.23%, which should be modified to
6n
89n+log2 6
≈ 6.74% after concatenating some
decoy photons for security as mentioned in [28]. Similarly, the efficiency of the sealed-bid auction scheme using 7-qubit GHZ
states [11] is calculated as 6n92n+log2 6 ≈ 6.52%, which falls to
6n
98n+log2 6
≈ 6.12% due to the addition of some decoy photons in
accordance with the scheme proposed in Ref. [28].
There is an interesting feature of the proposed scheme- it can be performed without the auctioneer. This is so because, each
party obtains bidding information of the others in the post-confirmation stage. If bidding is performed without an auctioneer in
that case the qubit efficiency of the scheme would have been 6n90n = 6.67%, which is comparable with the qubit efficiency of the
schemes that use complete-graph structure. In brief, our scheme is only slightly less efficient compared to the schemes based on
complete-graph structure, but it provides higher security against collusion attacks and requires quantum resources that are easier
to prepare.
5 Conclusion
We proposed a scheme for quantum sealed-bid auction, which is free from the limitations of the existing schemes for the same
purpose proposed by other groups, and have shown that the proposed scheme is not only secure it is also efficient. The advantages
of the present scheme are actually obtained by transforming a complete-graph structure to a circular structure and subsequently
transforming that to sub-circles. This unique strategy and the benefits obtained by adopting this strategy are expected to open up
a new window for more research related to quantum auction for a couple of reasons. Firstly, sealed-bid auction is an extremely
important process in our daily life, secondly, with an increase in l (the number of sub-circles) the size of the entangled state
required reduces whereas the security against collusion attack increases. This trade-off has a fantastic effect as at present prepa-
ration and maintenance of s-qubit entangled state is very difficult when s is large. However, in our case smaller s leads to better
security in one hand and scalability on the other. It seems feasible that the proposed scheme can be realized experimentally using
available technologies, but this was not the case with most of the other proposals as s was very high for them. Further, auction
process demands security and quantum version of the same can provide unconditional security which is not possible by any of
its classical counterparts. Keeping this in mind, we conclude this paper with an expectation that the works reported here will be
realized experimentally and will find applications in daily life.
Acknowledgment: AP and KT thank Defense Research & Development Organization (DRDO), India for the support pro-
vided through the project number ERIP/ER/1403163/M/01/1603.
References
[1] Anindita Banerjee, Chitra Shukla, Kishore Thapliyal, Anirban Pathak, and Prasanta K Panigrahi. Asymmetric quantum
dialogue in noisy environment. Quantum Inf. Process., 2016.
[2] Charles H Bennett. Quantum cryptography: Public key distribution and coin tossing. In International Conference on
Computer System and Signal Processing, IEEE, 1984, pages 175–179, 1984.
[3] Bennett, Charles H. Quantum cryptography using any two non orthogonal states. Phys. Rev. Lett., 68(21):3121, 1992.
[4] Adán Cabello. Quantum key distribution in the holevo limit. Phys. Rev. Lett., 85(26):5635, 2000.
[5] Ralph Cassady. Auctions and auctioneering. University of California Press, 1967.
8
[6] Artur K Ekert. Quantum cryptography based on bell’s theorem. Phys. Rev. Lett., 67(6):661, 1991.
[7] Ari Juels and Michael Szydlo. A two-server, sealed-bid auction protocol. In International Conference on Financial Cryp-
tography, pages 72–86. Springer, 2002.
[8] Hiroaki Kikuchi, Michael Hakavy, and Doug Tygar. Multi-round anonymous auction protocols. IEICE Trans. Inf. & Syst.,
82(4):769–777, 1999.
[9] Wen-Jie Liu, Hai-Bin Wang, Gong-Lin Yuan, Yong Xu, Zhen-Yu Chen, Xing-Xing An, Fu-Gao Ji, and Gnim Tchalim
Gnitou. Multiparty quantum sealed-bid auction using single photons as message carrier. Quantum Inf. Process., 15(2):869–
879, 2016.
[10] Yi-Min Liu, Dong Wang, Xian-Song Liu, and Zhan-Jun Zhang. Revisiting Naseri’s secure quantum sealed-bid auction. Int.
J. Quantum Inf., 7(06):1295–1301, 2009.
[11] Yi Luo, Zhiwen Zhao, Zhangji Zhao, Haiming Long, Wen Su, and Yixian Yang. The loophole of the improved secure
quantum sealed-bid auction with post-confirmation and solution. Quantum Inf. Process., 12(1):295–302, 2013.
[12] KUDO Michiharu. Secure electronic sealed-bid auction protocol with public key cryptography. IEICE Trans. Fundamentals,
81(1):20–27, 1998.
[13] Mosayeb Naseri. Secure quantum sealed-bid auction. Opt. Commun., 282(9):1939–1943, 2009.
[14] Michael A Nielsen and Isaac L Chuang. Quantum computation and quantum information. Cambridge University Press,
2010.
[15] Navroz Patel. Quantum games: States of play. Nature, 445(7124):144–146, 2007.
[16] Anirban Pathak. Elements of quantum computation and quantum communication. Taylor & Francis, 2013.
[17] Edward W Piotrowski and Jan Sładkowski. Quantum english auctions. Physica A, 318(3):505–515, 2003.
[18] Edward W Piotrowski and Jan Sładkowski. Quantum auctions: Facts and myths. Physica A, 387(15):3949–3953, 2008.
[19] Su-Juan Qin, Fei Gao, Qiao-Yan Wen, Luo-Ming Meng, and Fu-Chen Zhu. Cryptanalysis and improvement of a secure
quantum sealed-bid auction. Opt. Commun., 282(19):4014–4016, 2009.
[20] Todd E Rockoff and Michael Groves. Design of an internet-based system for remote dutch auctions. Internet Research,
5(4):10–16, 1995.
[21] Rishi Dutt Sharma, Kishore Thapliyal, Anirban Pathak, Alok Kumar Pan, and Asok De. Which verification qubits perform
best for secure communication in noisy channel? Quantum Inf. Process., 15(4):1703–1718, 2016.
[22] Chitra Shukla, Nasir Alam, and Anirban Pathak. Protocols of quantum key agreement solely using bell states and bell
measurement. Quantum Inf. Process., 13(11):2391–2405, 2014.
[23] Chitra Shukla, Vivek Kothari, Anindita Banerjee, and Anirban Pathak. On the group-theoretic structure of a class of quantum
dialogue protocols. Phys. Lett. A, 377(7):518–527, 2013.
[24] Zhiwei Sun, Jiwu Huang, and Ping Wang. Efficient multiparty quantum key agreement protocol based on commutative
encryption. Quantum Inf. Process., 15(5):2101–2111, 2016.
[25] Zhiwei Sun, Xiaoqiang Sun, and Ping Wang. Multiparty quantum key agreement protocol secure against collusion attacks.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1604.01112, 2016.
[26] Koutarou Suzuki, Kunio Kobayashi, and Hikaru Morita. Efficient sealed-bid auction using hash chain. In International
Conference on Information Security and Cryptology, pages 183–191. Springer, 2000.
[27] Jing-Tao Wang, Xiu-Bo Chen, Gang Xu, Xiang-Hua Meng, and Yi-Xian Yang. A new quantum sealed-bid auction protocol
with secret order in post-confirmation. Quantum Inf. Process., 14(10):3899–3911, 2015.
[28] Qing-Le Wang, Wei-Wei Zhang, and Qi Su. Revisiting “The loophole of the improved secure quantum sealed-bid auction
with post-confirmation and solution”. Int. J. Theor. Phys., 53(9):3147–3153, 2014.
[29] Yuji Watanabe and Hideki Imai. Reducing the round complexity of a sealed-bid auction protocol with an off-line ttp. In
Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Computer and communications security, pages 80–86. ACM, 2000.
9
[30] Hu Xiong, Zhong Chen, and Fagen Li. Bidder-anonymous english auction protocol based on revocable ring signature.
Expert Syst. Appl., 39(8):7062–7066, 2012.
[31] Yu-Guang Yang, Mosayeb Naseri, and Qiao-Yan Wen. Improved secure quantum sealed-bid auction. Opt. Commun.,
282(20):4167–4170, 2009.
[32] Wang Zhang-Yin. Quantum secure direct communication and quantum sealed-bid auction with EPR pairs. Commun. Theor.
Phys., 54(6):997, 2010.
[33] Zhangji Zhao and Weijia Wang. Comment on" cryptanalysis and improvement of the secure quantum sealed-bid auction
with post confirmation". Int. J. Quantum Inf., 12(06):1475001, 2014.
[34] Zhiwen Zhao, Mosayeb Naseri, and Yuanqing Zheng. Secure quantum sealed-bid auction with post-confirmation. Opt.
Commun., 283(16):3194–3197, 2010.
[35] Yuanqing Zheng and Zhiwen Zhao. Comment on: Secure quantum sealed-bid auction [opt. comm. 282 (2009) 1939]. Opt.
Commun., 282(20):4182, 2009.
10
